It applies to clandestine operations for espionage, and for a clandestine phase prior to direct action DA or unconventional warfare UW. Many of the techniques here are important in counterintelligence. Defensive counterintelligence personnel need to know them to recognize espionage, sabotage, etc. Offensive counterintelligence specialists may actually use them against foreign intelligence services FIS. While DA and UW can be conducted by national military or paramilitary organizations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups appear to use considerably different clandestine cell system structure, for command, control and operations, than do national forces. Cell systems are evolving to more decentralized models, sometimes because they are enabled by new forms of electronic communications.
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Clandestine human intelligence is intelligence collected from human sources using clandestine espionage methods. These sources consist of people working in a variety of roles within the intelligence community. Examples include the quintessential spy known by professionals as an asset or agent , who collects intelligence; couriers and related personnel, who handle an intelligence organization's ideally secure communications ; and support personnel, such as access agents, who may arrange the contact between the potential spy and the case officer who recruits them.
The recruiter and supervising agent may not necessarily be the same individual. Large espionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. Espionage networks are typically organized as a cell system , in which each clandestine operator knows only the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method which may not necessarily involve another person to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells.
This cellular organization is a form of compartmentalisation , which is an important tactic for controlling access to information, used in order to diminish the risk of discovery of the network or the release of sensitive information. Espionage is the act of obtaining typically via covert methods information which an adversary would not want the entity conducting the espionage to have. Espionage is inherently clandestine , and the legitimate holder of the information may change plans or take other countermeasures once it is known that the information is in unauthorized hands.
HUMINT is in a constant battle with counterintelligence , and the relationship can become very blurry, as one side tries to "turn" agents of the other into reporting to the other side. Recruiters can run false flag operations, where a citizen of country A believes they are providing intelligence to country B, when they are actually providing it to country C.
Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines , espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report , or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom he was selling information. This article does not cover military units that penetrate deep between enemy lines, but generally in uniform, to conduct special reconnaissance.
Such military units can be on the border of the line, in international law, which defines them as spies, if they conduct information in civilian clothes. In some circumstances, the uniformed personnel may act in support to the actual agents, providing communications, transportation, financial, and other support. Yet another discipline is covert operations , where personnel, uniformed or not, may conduct raids , sabotage , assassinations , propaganda i.
Black's Law Dictionary defines espionage as: "gathering, transmitting, or losing In the UK, "Under the Act, a person commits the offence of 'spying' if he, for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State;. The US defines espionage towards itself as "The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
See List of intelligence agencies for a more complete list. Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort i. Many nations routinely spy on both their enemies and allies, although they maintain a policy of not making comment on this. In addition to utilizing agencies within a government many also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others.
Not all clandestine human sources change their loyalties to the country to which they were born, or owed their first allegiance. In this section we are talking of the classical and actually rare "spy", who really is a loyal citizen of country A but obtains information from country B, either through informal means e.
A special case is of the Country B loyalist who controls agents or provides other supporting or managerial functions against Country A. Richard Sorge was a Soviet citizen i. Sorge was eventually caught and executed by the Japanese, who generally honored his bravery. Especially in wartime, while a country may need to execute an agent, they sometimes respect them. It is a truism that a live captured spy has more potential value than a dead one, since a live one can still be interrogated, or perhaps turned into a double agent.
There have been cases where countries have announced the execution of people who are actually alive. Dangled moles start out being loyal to one country B, but go to work for another service A, reporting back to their original service. Such operations can become "infinities of mirrors"  as the mole may be detected and the service by which they are employed tries to double them, which may or may not work.
One of the best-known, and apparently most successful, was the early Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby i. Philby is discussed further below. As far as is known from public sources, the only mole, already loyal to a foreign service, who went to work for the CIA i. While, as far as is known in public sources, still loyal to his original agency, Koecher was ordered to report to Moscow by Oleg Kalugin , longtime legal resident of the USSR in the US.
Kalugin accused Koecher of being a US double agent. The arrest was legally tainted, and Koecher was eventually exchanged for Soviet prisoners, both sides apparently not wanting the affair to be in a public court. With the exception of penetration moles, other human sources start out as highly trusted by their services. What causes an individual to betray service A, typically his country of birth? The most common shorthand for changing allegiance is MICE , an acronym for:.
While he received large amounts of money, he apparently felt unappreciated in his own service and spying on it satisfied his ego. Psychological factors can apply to people changing allegiance for reasons other than coercion or ideology. To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage.
It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage. His performance in his government job if presently employed is separate from espionage; espionage does not really discount his contribution in the workplace.
Security programs e. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events. He finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards he is able to solve that problem. He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do the information would really be better protected.
This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces his resolve. After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues even flourishes. In the course of long term activity subjects may reconsider their involvement. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves, or both. Glamour if present earlier subsides.
They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment. According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted.
News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but not noticed. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored. They emphasize the "essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.
According to a Defense Department study, financial incentives and external coercion have played diminishing roles in motivating Americans to spy against the United States, but divided loyalties are increasingly evident in recent espionage cases. The study said, "Two thirds of American spies since have volunteered.
Offenders since are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties, and therefore they are more likely to be motivated to spy from divided loyalties. Ames seems to have been motivated primarily by money.
Among the most important moles, a senior officer already in place when he started reporting, for ideological reasons, to service B actually two B's, SIS and CIA , was Col. Oleg Penkovsky. Recruitment can be done through personal relationships, from casual sex and blackmail to friendship or romance.
Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the KH reconnaissance satellite.
To an interviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem"—constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH manual. Other than the dangled moles described above, moles start out as loyal to their own country A. They may or may not be a trained intelligence officer. Note that some intelligence professionals reserve the term mole to refer to enemy personnel that personally know important things about enemy intelligence operations, technology, or military plans.
A person such as a clerk or courier e. To be clear, all moles are assets, but not all assets are moles. Another special case is a "deep cover" or "sleeper" mole, who may enter a service, possibly at a young age, but definitely not reporting or doing anything that would attract suspicion, until reaching a senior position. Kim Philby is an example of an agent actively recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service while he was already committed to Communism.
Philby, at first, concentrated on doing a good job for the British, so he could rise in trust and authority. An individual may want to leave their service at once, perhaps from high-level disgust, or low-level risk of having been discovered in financial irregularities and is just ahead of arrest.
Even so, the defector certainly brings knowledge with him, and may be able to bring documents or other materials of value. Philip Agee is an example of a US CIA officer who came to the belief that he was working on behalf of an ideology he had come to hate.
Eventually, he resigned, and clandestinely went to Cuba , telling their intelligence service everything he knew, with the stated goal  of damaging the CIA.
Agee claims the CIA was satisfied with his work and did not want him to leave, although the author, John Barrow, claims that he was close to being discharged for improper personal conduct. Soviet, and now Russian, doctrine has some interesting insights that might well be useful to the West. For example, rather than use the term "defector", which has a negative connotation, they use the Russian word dobrozhelatel , "well-wisher," as used here virtually the equivalent of "walk-in.
While the term "well-wisher" may be positive, in Serov's view, he does not assume a well-wisher has value to offer. The majority actually turn out to be offering material of no significant value. The first task is to determine if they are random sympathizers who fail to understand the subject they propose to discuss, or are active provocations being run by foreign counterintelligence. Provocateurs obtain some value if they can simply identify the intelligence officers in an embassy, so the initial interviews are, unless there is a strong reason to the contrary, conducted by low-level staff.
Seminar in Tradecraft and HumInt
Clandestine human intelligence is intelligence collected from human sources using clandestine espionage methods. These sources consist of people working in a variety of roles within the intelligence community. Examples include the quintessential spy known by professionals as an asset or agent , who collects intelligence; couriers and related personnel, who handle an intelligence organization's ideally secure communications ; and support personnel, such as access agents, who may arrange the contact between the potential spy and the case officer who recruits them. The recruiter and supervising agent may not necessarily be the same individual. Large espionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. Espionage networks are typically organized as a cell system , in which each clandestine operator knows only the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method which may not necessarily involve another person to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells.
Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques
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Clandestine human intelligence
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